Rehabilitation of Witnesses: May an Impeached, Contradicted or Discredited Witness Be Rehabilitated by Showing That He Has Made Declarations Out of Court Which Are Consistent with His Testimony? by Shientag, Daniel M.
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 23 
Number 2 Volume 23, April 1949, Number 2 Article 5 
July 2013 
Rehabilitation of Witnesses: May an Impeached, Contradicted or 
Discredited Witness Be Rehabilitated by Showing That He Has 
Made Declarations Out of Court Which Are Consistent with His 
Testimony? 
Daniel M. Shientag 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Shientag, Daniel M. (1949) "Rehabilitation of Witnesses: May an Impeached, Contradicted or Discredited 
Witness Be Rehabilitated by Showing That He Has Made Declarations Out of Court Which Are Consistent 
with His Testimony?," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 23 : No. 2 , Article 5. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol23/iss2/5 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
NOTES AND COMMENT
procedural and substantive law, but rather should seek to bring about
substantially the same results as would obtain in a state court. By
refusing to enforce Section 61-b a federal court may change the en-
tire complexion of a case. On. the one hand, if the court refuses to
enforce the statute, the defendant corporation stands to lose a very
substantial sum in counsel fees, and on the other hand, if the court
does enforce it and plaintiff is unable to meet the statutory require-
ments, the case will be at an end. The result brought about by the
ruling in Boyd v. Bell and the result that would have been brought
about had the case been tried in a state court are strikingly at vari-
ance and assuredly the federal court there was far from being
"another court of the state."
Adding emphasis to the rule that whether or not a statute is
considered substantive or procedural is immaterial, the Supreme
Court of the United States has held that a federal court in a diversity
case should enforce the public policy of the state. The public policy
of the State of New York will be completely ignored if Boyd v. Bell
is to be followed.
The clash of authority both on the issue of applicability and on
the issue of appealability makes it apparent that a decision by the
United States Supreme Court will be required to decisively settle the




MAY AN IMPEACHED, CONTRADICTED OR DISCREDITED WITNESS BE
REHABILITATED BY SHOWING THAT HE HAS MADE DECLARATIONS OUT
OF COURT WHICH ARE CONSISTENT WITH HIS TESTIMONY?
I. The General Rule
In England and in this jurisdiction until the latter part of the
18th and early part of the 19th centuries, it had been the practice of
the courts to allow the testimony of a witness to be corroborated or
confirmed by permitting the introduction of declarations of the wit-
ness made out of court, whether under oath or not, of the same tenor
as the testimony then being given.1 This appears to have been done
59 The Supreme Court has an opportunity to decide these questions in the
pending case of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation.
I People v. Vane, 12 Wend. 78 (N. Y. 1834) ; Jackson v. Etz, 5 Cow. 314
(N. Y. 1826); Knox's Trial, 7 How. St. Tr. 763, 790 (1679); Lutterell v.
Reynell, 1 Mod. 282, 86 Eng. Rep. 887 (1671).
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even in the absence of impeachment and on the theory that there was
some corroborative force in the fact of reiteration. 2
The admission of such declarations resulted in the trial of ex-
traneous issues and was unfounded in reason. It was fallacious to
assume that numerous repetitions of the same story clothed it with
credence and rendered it trustworthy.Y
Accordingly, by the middle of the 19th century the great weight
of authority both in England and in this country recognized the fal-
lacy of permitting such evidence and excluded it. The rule was then
adopted that the testimony of an impeached, contradicted or dis-
credited witness could not be corroborated, confirmed or bolstered by
establishing that such witness made consistent declarations out of
court.
4
This rule of excl~ision, entrenched as it became by authority,
was founded upon sound, cogent reasoning. A contrary doctrine
would degenerate litigation into a contest for the latest version of a
witness, and enable such witness to control the effect of prior in-
consistent declarations which he subsequently desired to qualify or
destroy.5
II. The Exception
The present general rule, as stated above, was enunciated for
the first time in New York in the case of Robb v. Hackley.6  Coin-
cident therewith the court recognized the existence of an exception
to its operation.7 Thus, where a witness is discredited and his tes-
timony assailed as a fabrication formulated for the exigencies of the
trial and motivated by some self-interest or otherwise, the party call-
ing him may show that, at a time when the imputed motive did not
2 Lutterell v. Reynell, supra note 1; 4 WIGMORE, EViDENcE § 1123 (3d
ed. 1940). Since the statements referred to are received only as bearing on
the credibility of the witness, and not as proof of any fact in issue, there is
no conflict with the hearsay rule.3 See People v. Katz, 209 N. Y. 311, 342, 103 N. E. 305, 315 (1913).
4 Ellicott v. Pearl, 10 Pet. 412, 9 L. ed. 475 (1836) ; Robb v. Hackley, 23
Wend. 50 (N. Y. 1840); Rex v. Parker, 3 Doug. 242, 99 Eng. Rep. 634
(1783); see also 4 WIGMORE, EVmENCE § 1125 et seq. (3d ed. 1940).
5 See Ellicott v. Pearl, 10 Pet. 412, 440, 9 L. ed. 475, 487 (1836); and
Crawford v. Nilan, 289 N. Y. 444, 451, 46 N. E. 2d 512, 516 (1943), where
the court said: "Success would come to him who obtained it [the latest
version] even though he had to keep the witness incommunicado, until rushed
upon the witness-stand, for fear he might give a different and still later
version, which he could make accord with the testimony he had then decided
to give."
623 Wend. 50 (N. Y. 1840).
7 "If an attempt is made to discredit the witness, on the ground that his
testimony is given under the influence of some motive prompting him to make
a false or colored statement, the party calling him has been allowed to show
in reply, that the witness made similar declarations at a time when the imputed
motive did not exist." Id. at 52.
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exist, the witness made declarations consistent with the testimony
being given.8
In the more than one hundred years since the Robb case was
decided the general rule and the exception thereto have remained
without limitation or qualification on the one hand, or engraftment
or enlargement on the other.9 Neither has any distinction been
drawn as to the applicability of the general rule and its exception"
between civil and criminal causes.' 0
Clear and simple as the rule and its exception seem to be, dif-
ficulty in application has developed, as often happens, and there has
crept into some of the decisions a lapse of rigid enforcement with
disturbing consequences.
III. Applying the General Rule and the Exception
In People v. Van Arsdale 11 a witness volunteered under cross-
examination, the information that he had made a statement to the
District Attorney's office prior to testifying. Counsel for the defen-
dant charged that the witness had been "coached" before the state-
ment (which was in narrative form) had been taken, and sought to
establish this by a line of questioning as to what occurred in the
District Attorney's office immediately preceding the transcription of
the statement.1 2 The paper was then offered in evidence by the Dis-
trict Attorney on the ground that it and the testimony given were
consistent. No error in its receipt was found.' 3
8 Neither the general rule nor the exception thereto should be confused
with the rule that "... . where declarations or acts of a party are used against
him as admissions tending to show an inconsistent attitude, it is always open
to him to explain the apparent contradiction." Ferris v. Sterling, 214 N. Y.
249, 254, 108 N. E. 406, 408 (1915) ; D'Ambra v. Rhinelander, 234 N. Y. 289,
137 N. E. 333 (1922).9 See Crawford v. Nilan, 289 N. Y. 444, 46 N. E. 2d 512 (1943).
20 Compare Crawford v. Nilan, supra note 9, with People v. Katz, 209
N. Y. 311, 103 N. E. 305 (1913).
11264 App. Div. 300, 35 N. Y. S. 2d 426 (2d Dep't 1942), rev'd on other
grounds, 289 N. Y. 810, 47 N. E. 2d 53 (1943) (evidence legally insufficient
to sustain verdict).
12 "In connection with this paper he flatly charged that the witness under
examination was 'coached.' After thus impugning the integrity of the witness,
and with the paper in his hand, he asked repeatedly whether the witness had
been interrogated in question and answer form, .... " People v. Van Arsdale,
264 App. Div. 300, 301, 35 N. Y. S. 2d 426, 428 (1942).
'3 "Certain questions insinuated that what happened while the witness was
being questioned by the district attorney was not reflected in the paper; others
charged or insinuated that the witness had been influenced or corrupted by
named individuals. All these things constituted further attacks upon the in-
tegrity of the witness in relation to the paper. This conduct of defendant's
counsel made the exhibit admissible in evidence because the charges and the
manner of interrogation of the witness made applicable the exception to the
general rule in respect of a prior consistent statement which permits its receipt
in evidence 'when the witness rests under the imputation of a recently formed
motive to falsify,' as well as on the theory that 'it tends to support the in-
1949 ]
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Clearly it was the method used in procuring the statement that
was under attack. The statement itself was not inconsistent with
the testimony given. As a statement it could not be used to impeach
or contradict the testimony given upon the trial. The defendant's
asserted grievance was that the statement was false and untrue and
born of coaching and subornation and was followed through by the
witness giving similar tainted testimony upon the trial. It is difficult
to understand upon what theory the court received the paper in evi-
dence when offered by the District Attorney. Certainly it was not
admissible as "a prior consistent declaration" since nothing inconsis-
tent with its contents had been offered or produced. Furthermore,
it was not admissible upon any theory that it came within the ex-
ception to the general rule to show that the statement was made at
a time when there was no motive to falsify.14  If he lent himself to
coaching or subornation at the time he made the statement, then
whatever motive he had at that time also controlled the testimony
given upon the trial. In other words, the testimony given upon the
trial was not attacked as a recent fabrication prompted by a present
motive to falsify. If such had been the case, then with entire pro-
priety the District Attorney could have shown that a statement con-
sistent with the testimony given was made before any motive to
falsify existed.
There does not seem to be any validity to the contention made
to support the competency of the statement that it tended to nega-
tive the charge that the witness had been coached or suborned into
making it. The inflexible rule, followed throughout the years, was
sorely strained by the untenable theory upon which the decision was
predicated.
In Donovan v. Moore-McCorinack Lines, Inc.,15 plaintiff was
injured by a bag which was being unloaded from a steamship. The
claim of negligence was failure to give warning of the delivery of
the bag into a chute leading from the steamship to the dock. Plain-
tiff testified to the failure to give such warning. Upon the trial he
was confronted with a written statement made a day after the acci-
tegrity of the witness, no less than the accuracy of his recollection'; or where
the witness rests, as in the case at bar, under the charge that he has been
suborned or has recently fabricated his testimony to meet the exigencies of
the case." (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 302, 35 N. Y. S. 2d at 428.
14 Apparently the departure from the rule was recognized for immediately
after holding the receipt of the evidence proper the court said, "In any event,
... the admission of the paper under the circumstances, even if it were not
strictly proper, involved no prejudicial error." Id. at 302, 35 N. Y. S. 2d at
429. See also Donovan v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 266 App. Div. 406,
407, 42 N. Y. S. 2d 441, 442 (1st Dep't 1943). "We are cognizant of the
prevalence of the practice of having investigators interview injured persons
and receive statements from them. Under all the circumstances we hold that
it was not error to receive the 'consistent' statement in evidence; or, if error
occurred, that it was harmless."
15266 App. Div. 406, 42 N. Y. S. 2d 441 (1st Dep't 1943).
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dent which indicated that due warning had been given, but that his
back was turned toward the chute at the time. The statement if
given and true was directly opposed to the testimony and destruc-
tive of plaintiff's claim of negligence. Clearly they were hopelessly
inconsistent.
However, there was some question whether the statement ac-
curately reflected what the plaintiff actually said when it was taken
a day after the accident. There was no unqualified admission by the
plaintiff that the statement as produced in court constituted his ver-
sion of what occurred. Thus an issue arose as to the correctness
of the statement which on its face was at complete variance with the
testimony.
Under these circumstances plaintiff was permitted to show that
five days subsequent to the date of the statement in question he made
another to his employer in which he denied that any warning was
given. It was held that no error was committed in admitting into
evidence the latter "consistent" declaration; that it was competent
on the theory that it had some probative value as to whether or not
the prior contradictory or inconsistent statement had in fact been
made or given.
Again it is difficult to follow the theory or reasoning employed.
And again we find what appears to be an obvious intrusion upon
the rule and its exception under consideration. Plaintiff's denial
upon the trial of the giving of warning and that the first statement
which was inconsistent with his testimony was inaccurate could not
be confirmed and the witness rehabilitated by showing a subsequent
statement to his employer which tended to confirm the trial testi-
mony. Contradictory versions of the same transactions made at
different times should not form the basis of admitting into evidence
the statement confirmatory of the testimony being given.16 It would
be entirely proper to show that an inconsistent statement was not
given or was inaccurately transcribed or that some overreaching
conduct was practiced in obtaining it. The witness should be per-
mitted to explain the circumstances under which it was obtained if
the statement in question, which is inconsistent with his testimony,
was in fact untruthfully or inaccurately reported.
But the admission into evidence of the second statement given
to the employer could have no probative value in determining the
truth or accuracy of the declaration contained in the first statement.
The motive of the witness had no bearing on the question so as to
render admissible that which clearly was not competent. Upon the
trial his motive was to establish negligence arising out of failure to
give warning. The same motive prompted the exculpatory statement
given to the employer in which he sought to hold himself blameless
for the happening of the accident.
16 Crawford v. Nilan, 289 N. Y. 442, 46 N. E. 2d 512 (1943).
1949]
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IV. Conclusion
Whenever the question of the admissibility of prior consistent
declarations has heretofore been raised before the Court of Appeals,
all of the elements stated in the exception to the rule had to be pres-
ent before receipt of such declarations was sanctioned. Thus, the
confession of an accomplice, discredited only by the distrust and sus-
picion inherent in the fact that he was an accomplice, was rejected
when offered to confirm his testimony; 17 but where an accomplice
has been impeached on the ground that he was testifying to gain
immunity, it has been held proper to show that the same account
was given by him before immunity was promised.18 Similarly, where
it is charged that ownership of an automobile has been disclaimed
at the trial for the first time to avoid liability, it has been held com-
petent to show that weeks and months prior to the accident the
same disclaimer was made."9
But where the witness is contradicted only by a statement in-
consistent with the version presently given it has been held incom-
petent to bolster his testimony with other statements made subse-
quent to the impeaching document. 20 In the main the courts have
studiously followed the general rule and strictly limited the applica-
tion of the exception thereto.2 '
The departures made in the Van Arsdale and Donovan cases
seem well calculated, if followed, to permit a party or a witness who
is conscious of having made declarations, the force of which he would
like to qualify, weaken or destroy, to control their effect by making
subsequent declarations of the same tenor as the testimony he plans
to give upon the trial. The infringements and incursions of these
cases upon a salutary rule of evidence are disquieting and may give
rise to additional variations from a principle to which there should
be unyielding adherence. "Harmless error" in the admission of
these otherwise incompetent statements is an unsatisfactory answer
to the question involved.
DANIEL M. SHIENTAG.
11 People v. Edwards, 282 N. Y. 413, 26 N. E. 2d 757 (1940).
is People v. Katz, 209 N. Y. 311, 103 N. E. 305 (1913).
39 Ferris v. Sterling, 214 N. Y. 249, 108 N. E. 406 (1915).
20 Crawford v. Nilan, 289 N. Y. 442, 46 N. E. 2d 512 (1943).
21 See People v. Racciatti, 225 App. Div. 284, 232 N. Y. Supp. 329 (4th
Dep't 1929) ; Doherty v. Rogers, 209 App. Div. 291, 204 N. Y. Supp. 536 (4th
Dep't 1924); Dechert v. Municipal Electric Light Co., 39 App. Div. 490,
57 N. Y. Supp. 225 (lst Dep't 1899).
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